What Others Say

Link: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2008/20080818/edit.htm#4

One more day, one more retired Indian Army officer has belted out his so called analysis without solution. Read On....

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The Afghan imbroglio
Time to review anti-Taliban strategy
by Maj-Gen Ashok K. Mehta (retd)

THE ISI is in the eye of a storm. The US, Afghanistan and India have all accused the ISI of aiding and abetting the Taliban in Afghanistan. As usual, Pakistan is demanding evidence which has reportedly been provided by the US, but Islamabad continues to play the cat and mouse game.

As violence subsides in Iraq, it is surging in Afghanistan. NATO forces may be winning battles but the Taliban is still poised to win the war. Their commanders say while the Americans have the watches, we have the time.

During the last three months, the Taliban has inflicted more casualties on US forces than Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Taliban has changed tactics, combing massed assaults with suicide missions. Earlier in the year, a German-born Turkish citizen blew himself up near a US post, the episode immortalised by Al-Qaeda on a DVD currently in circulation. Last month, 200 Taliban activists stormed the US post in Kunar province near the Paksitan-Afghanistan border, forcing the US to abandon the post.

Other Taliban hits this year include the fifth assassination attempt on President Karzai in Kabul, the daring and deft jailbreak in Kandahar, and the precision suicide bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, the ugliest ever in Afghanistan and the ninth this year in the capital. Suicide attacks have risen dramatically from none in 2002 to two and three in the following two years, 17 in 2005, peaking to 123 in 2006, 117 in 2007 and this year already beyond the 100 mark.

There were no suicide attacks against the Soviets in the 1980s; only face-to-face combat was witnessed. Most of the martyrs are non-Afghans, including children, the majority of them ill trained. Until recently suicide attacks in Afghanistan were not effective as attrition of unintended civilians was eight times more than targeted combatants. As Al- Qaeda commanders now believe, the war in Afghanistan, not Iraq, is winnable, the suicide brigade is being diverted towards Kabul. The psychological impact of the human bomber on civilians and soldiers alike is devastating. Worse, there is no antidote.

American Gen David Mckieman is the new Commander of the US-led 40-nation ISAF of 52700 soldiers. Roughly 100,000 Afghan military and police personnel trained by the West, capable of undertaking autonomous operations, are in support.

The security situation has suffered a further setback. Even provinces close to Kabul like Vardak, Ghazni and Logar are no longer safe. Kabul is on pins and needles following the bombing of the Indian Embassy. The opium-rich Helmand province remains the bone of contention between NATO and the Taliban.

Last year, while more than 8000 persons died, the maximum since 2001, this year 2400 have died so far. Casualties have been mounting by the day. Between 2001 and mid-July, 14080 civilians died. Another 2350 Afghan military and police personnel and 3680 Taliban insurgents have been killed. NATO losses include 115 British and 570 American soldiers. The dramatic rise in violence is attributed by NATO to a 40 per cent increase in infiltration from the tribal areas across the Pakistan border following on and off peace deals between Pakistan and the Taliban.

Pakistan’s revised strategy was operationalised soon after the new civilian government took office in March this year. Inherent in the peace agreements is a quid pro quo: the Taliban will cease acts of violence inside Pakistan if Islamabad will turn a Nelson’s eye to its cross-border activities in Afghanistan. Though this strategy resembles Pakistan’s acquiescence of cross-LoC forays by Kashmiri and Pakistani terrorist groups, it has put the US in a quandary over managing its relations with its frontline ally on counter-terrorism.

US commanders have been warning Pakistan that cross-border attacks would become inevitable when fires emanate from across the border. President Pervez Musharraf has said that no fresh NATO attacks in the country’s tribal areas will be tolerated, adding the warning that Pakistan reserves the right to retaliate. This is the first time anyone in Pakistan has indicated reprisals. Islamabad has consistently denied any attacks against NATO forces from Pakistani soil. On the other hand, it has repeated that a stable Afghanistan is in the interest of Pakistan. Both these assertions have been contested by Mr Karzai, who has threatened hot pursuit.

Pakistan, as everyone knows, is the key to a stable Afghanistan. But over the years, it has spawned jihad on both its flanks. The Pakistan Army has little urge to fight the Taliban on its soil. Instead, its nostalgia for a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, providing it strategic depth, is the key driver of a failed policy.

The cost of this unwinnable war, besides the colossal human tragedy and 5 million refugees in a country of 32 million, is staggering. The US alone is spending $100 million a day and has invested since 9/11 more than $ 172 billion. International aid since 2001 amounts to nearly $ 50 billion while another $20 billion was committed by donors in June this year at Paris.

There is no dearth of funding though priorities and projects are becoming haphazard. Development assistance must be applied in provinces where it can be sustained and not in places like Helmand and Kandahar is one view. The classic theory is that only development will wean away the people from the Taliban, and, therefore, defence and development should go hand in hand. Afghanistan is questioning this tenet of counter-insurgency.

The other problem is that part of the aid gets ploughed back to the donor countries. Kabul reported that of the $3.5 billion utilised in 2007, $1.3 billion was spent on international consultants, some being paid $1000 a day. Add seepage and corruption, there is little to show on the ground. This month, aid agencies confirmed that security had deteriorated and that they would have to review the feasibility of projects. Nineteen aid workers have been killed this year, more than the total lost in 2007.

Despite such massive military and economic investment, indicators of success are few and far between. Everyone involved in Afghanistan is agreed that it is going to be a long haul. British historian-diplomat Olaf Caroe, a veteran of the Great Game, observed: “Unlike other wars, Afghanistan wars become serious only when they are over.” Shifting the focus to Iraq was indeed a big folly. Yet, Prime Minister Gordon Brown has emphasised: “We will never again allow Afghanistan to be a failed state”, referring to the first ever takeover of Kabul by a non-state actor.

The resolve of the British is next only to the US, the authors of the invasion of Afghanistan. While there is little hesitation among Western allies about their economic support to rebuild Afghanistan, few are prepared to keep soldiers fight the Taliban. While the US and the UK are in the vanguard of operations, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands have also figured in the Order of Battle though most others have opted to be left out of the battle. Given this unequal burden sharing and increasing body bags, it is a matter of time before the West calls it quits. Some Western diplomats are arguing that despite massive investment since 2001, Afghanistan is close to being a failed state.

The US-led Western alliance in Afghanistan has to rethink its politico-military strategy, and devise a new one that allows political accommodation of the Taliban in Kabul. It is clear that as long as Pakistan plays footsie with the Taliban, the latter cannot be marginalised militarily. Only when the ISI is muzzled can Kabul breathe normally. This would require US-Afghanistan-India networking.