What Others Say

The views expressed in The article in The People's Daily which is an Chinese official organ, on the issues concerning Indian motives and the international community apprehensions over nuclear safeguards, has evolved from Beijing’s own non proliferation records.

Beijing’s initial reaction to nuclear nonproliferation regimes like NPT, the NSG and IAEA was “discriminatory” attempts by the west to stop other countries to develop such industry and weapons. Subsequently they went on to build a stock pile of nuclear weapons and delivery mentods. In 1980s, Beijing violated its commitments to international nonproliferation norms, while official statements went the opposite way. In 1984 China joined the IAEA and agreed to partial safeguards over its nuclear exports instead of safeguards

China signed the NPT in 1992. Ironically, the NPT required only Chinese peaceful nuclear technology transfers and their recipient facilities be placed under IAEA safeguards, but did not require that the states importing the technology be under full-scope safeguards.

China was caught red handed selling ring magnets (used in the process of enriching uranium to weapons grade) to Pakistan right after that.

In January 2004, China applied to join the NSG. Simultaneously in late 2003 and early 2004 we all got the news of Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan’s proliferation network, which was based partly on years of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan.

Same year ,i.e, 2004 March, China had agreed to supply Pakistan with a second reactor at its Chashma facility, in violation of the very NSG guidelines China wanted to sign up to.

Nevertheless it joined the NSG.

The problem of Chinese nuclear proliferation still existed. Chinese masked nuclear transfers with gaps in the Chinese domestic enforcement network.

The Chinese then enacted several domestic laws that regulate and restrict the export of nuclear-related technology and material. In 2003 Beijing published a White Paper on “China’s Nonproliferation Policy and Measures” for the eyes of the international (and particularly the U.S.) audience that China has addressed their concerns.

Chinese role was critical in the development of the Pakistani bomb. Chinese were the midwifes of Pyongyang’s program. Washington Times report, in December 2002 notes that a Chinese firm sold to North Korea 20 tons of tributyl phosphate, which can be used to extract weapons-grade nuclear material from spent fuel.

The documents that Libya handed over to investigators as part of its agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons program included a Chinese nuclear warhead blueprint originally given to Pakistan.

In March 2005, Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, is that “... more work remains to be done by Beijing toward effective and consistent implementation and enforcement of its laws and policies. Unacceptable proliferant activity continues.”

Washington even now imposes sanctions on Chinese companies, some of which are state-owned, over the proliferation of technologies related to weapons of mass destruction.

Even Sharon Squassoni (Read a "non-Proliferation Ayatholla"), who is a senior analyst here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Congressional Research Service analyst (Duh!) during a speech in cold war relic institution dubbed Arms Control Association (what ever it means) 2-3 days before could not testify that Chinese stopped stock piling nuclear weapons. Sharon said " India also continues to produce fissile material, unlike at least four of the five original nuclear weapons states, and probably also China."

Worse Henry Sokolski (another non-Proliferation Ayatholla, sitting in same meeting as Sharon Squassoni), executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and a member of the Congressional Commission on Preventing WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, replying to a question on Chinese reaction on the Indo-US deal said"....Oddly enough, I’m not sure the Chinese are totally against these rules. They could see how they might help them. But I would say that they are at least cheering for one side right now, which is interesting. Don’t expect that to stop if people come to the conclusion to push the rules aside and start doing deals with this country or that country. China will continue to try to maneuver. That China agreed to sell nuclear items not just to Pakistan but India tells you just how playful they can be. They’re easy to underestimate. That’s a mistake to do." Ironically this guy had earlier said (in same meeting) "And then, what is China to make of all of this? (The India-US Nuclear deal).

CIA has also reported suspicion of Chinese assistance to the alleged Iranian bomb program.

Stephen G. Rademaker, assistant secretary of state for arms control, said in his testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March 2005 that Beijing’s “inability to take action against serial proliferations calls into question China’s commitment to truly curb proliferation to certain states.”

China has a record of cheating on its nonproliferation commitments while denying any wrongdoing. The article on India was the culmination of the Chinese Collective Nuclear Guilty Consciousness.